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INTRODUCTION
This reply brief seeks to fortify Sherrie's position on the following eight issues
raised by the parties' briefs:
1.

What version of Section 30-3-5 applies to Sherrie's alimony claim?

2.

Under that statute, must Sherrie show "extenuating circumstances" in order to
recover "new" alimony?

3.

Assuming this Court rejects Sherrie's answer to Question No. 1:
A.
B.

4.

Do the circumstances in this case constitute "extenuating circumstances"
within the meaning of the new statute?
Did the trial court commit reversible error in precluding Sherrie from
presenting additional evidence of "extenuating circumstances" sufficient to
justify imposition of continuing alimony obligations on Lynn?

Had Lynn's obligation to pay alimony under a prior order expired before Sherrie
. sought additional alimony? i.e. Is Sherrie's a "new" alimony claim?

5.

Under the law applicable to Sherrie's claim, may alimony be awarded to a
deserving former spouse even when it ]s sought after the obligation to pay
alimony under a prior order has ceased?

6.

Should Lynn be ordered to pay alimony to Sherrie?

7.

Should Lynn be ordered to pay Sherrie's reasonable costs and attorney's fees
incurred in establishing her entitlement to continuing alimony?

8.

On remand, should Sherrie be allowed to present evidence supporting her claim
to a share of Lynn's wealth based on her contention that it was generated
through a fraudulent, secretive wealth-building plan commenced during the
marriage?
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I.
WHAT VERSION OF SECTION 30-3-5 APPLIES TO
SHERRIE'S ALIMONY CLAIM?
The version in effect on August 23, 1994.
Sherrie's claim for continuing alimony based on her having contracted
debilitating arthritis is contained in the petition to modify she filed on August 23, 1994.
Although she later sought and was granted leave to amend that petition, the matters
added by amendment did not concern her alimony claim. (R. 465-471) Even if the
amendments did concern alimony, the alimony claim would still be governed by the law
in effect at the time the original petition to modify was filed on August 23, 1994. The
relation back doctrine of URCP Rule 15(c) is explicit. Whenever a claim asserted in an
amended pleading arose out of the matters set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. Rule 15(c), URCP.
Therefore, the version of UCA § 30-3-5 that applies to Sherrie's alimony claim is
the version in effect as of August 23, 1994.
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II.
UNDER THAT APPLICABLE STATUTE, MUST SHERRIE
SHOW "EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES" IN ORDER
TO RECOVER "NEW" ALIMONY?
No. The version of Section 30-3-5 in effect when Sherrie filed her petition to
modify in August of 1994 contains no requirement for a showing of "extenuating
circumstances". On the contrary, it provides in clear, unmistakable terms:
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of
the parties . . . as is reasonable and necessary.
UCA § 30-3-5(3) (1994) (See History: 1993, Ch. 261, Section 1, 1994, Ch. 284, Sect.
1).

Under this statute, the divorce court unquestionably has continuing jurisdiction to
make new orders for alimony when appropriate. There was and still is no case law to
the contrary.
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III.
ASSUMING THIS COURT REJECTS SHERRIE'S
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 1 (AND FINDS THAT THE
NEWVERSION OF SECTION 30-3-5 APPLIES):
A.

Do the Circumstances in This Case Constitute "Extenuating
Circumstances" Within the Meaning of the New Statute?

Yes. On May 1, 1995, a new version of Section 30-3-5 went into effect.
Subparagraph 7 (g) of that statute contains the following two subdivisions:
(g)

(i) The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The Court may not modify alimony or issue a new order
for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not
exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court
finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.

UCA §30-3-5(7)(g)(i, ii) (1995) (see history of laws 1995, Ch. 330, Sect. 1; 1997, Ch.

232, Sect. 4).
The trial court found the circumstances of this case to meet the requirements of
subsection (i). It expressly found that Sherrie's "rheumatoid arthritis condition
constitutes a material and substantial change in circumstances that were [sic] not
foreseeable at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce". (R. 658, para. 16.) It also
expressly found that Sherrie has need and Lynn has an ability to pay alimony. (R. 658,
Para. 18). The trial court nevertheless concluded as a matter of law that this case
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presented no "extenuating circumstances" within the meaning of the statute. That
conclusion, Sherrie submits, is erroneous.
Our legislature has given no clue as to the meaning it intended for "extenuating
circumstances". In the absence of legislative guidance, the words should be given their
plain meaning. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary includes these definitions
for the word "extenuate": to make thin or emaciated; to lessen the strength or effect of."
Extenuating circumstances, therefore, would include circumstances of hardship which
have rendered a party's resources "thin" or have weakened or emaciated a party.
The sudden onset of rheumatoid arthritis in the spring of 1994 seriously
compromised Sherrie's health. Her condition deteriorated dramatically to the point that
in March of 1996, she was no longer able to work. (R. 671; 694; Tr. Trans, p. 166,
pp. 39-40). Her condition also rendered her unable to qualify for medical insurance.
(R. 696; Tr. Trans, p. 45; R. 501). At the time of trial, her monthly expenses far
exceeded the $800.00 per month temporary alimony Judge Rigtrup had earlier ordered
Lynn to pay. (See R. 424-425; 441-442; Defendant's Trial Exhibits 2 and 3). She was
totally dependent upon welfare assistance from the LDS Church to maintain herself.
(R. 647). During the 14 month period immediately preceding the trial, Sherrie received
$9,906.98 in cash assistance form the LDS Church, in addition to food from the
Bishop's Storehouse of the Church's Welfare System. (See Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1;
R. 690-691; Tr. Trans, pp. 23-25). Both oral and documentary evidence was presented
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at trial that Sherrie's monthly expenses totaled $3,270.35. (See Defendant's Trial
Exhibits 2 and 3; Tr. Trans, pp. 46-49).
Taken as a whole, Sherrie's circumstances could hardly be any more extenuated
than they are at present. Lynn's circumstances contribute to the inequity of denying
Sherrie alimony. When he divorced Sherrie, he left her destitute. He then immediately
began to amass wealth and soon enjoyed prosperity even greater than that he and
Sherrie enjoyed during thefirsttwo decades of their marriage. Though it refused to
receive evidence of the extent of Lynn's wealth, the trial court did find that he currently
earns "at least $120,000 per year". (R. 644; 658, para. 13).
On pages 9 and 10 of his brief, Lynn claims that "pursuant to all prior Court
orders of payment, [he] was current in all his obligations to pay alimony to Sherrie" and
has done nothing to contribute to Sherrie's financial difficulties. This is simply not true.
For example, Lynn contumaciously refused to pay the temporary alimony he was
ordered to pay in the May 1, 1995 Minute Entry of Commissioner Arnett. His refusal to
pay resulted in serious financial difficulties for Sherrie. At length, she was required to
employ counsel to bring an Order to Show Cause against Lynn. That Order to Show
Cause resulted in an express finding that Lynn had not paid alimony as ordered by the
Court. (See October 5, 1995 Minute Entry of Commissioner Arnett; See also Sherrie's
July 3, 1995 Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause).
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If the circumstances in this case are not "extenuating" within the legislature's
intent, it is difficult to imagine a set of circumstances which could qualify as
"extenuating".

B.

Did The Trial Court Commit Reversible Error in Precluding
Sherrie From Presenting Additional Evidence of "Extenuating
Circumstances" Sufficient to Justify Imposition of Continuing
Alimony Obligations on Lynn?

Yes. Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, the district court granted
Lynn's motion in limine to prevent Sherrie from offering any evidence at trial supporting
her contention that Lynn had orchestrated his divorce and personal bankruptcy in a
manner to deny Sherrie a share in the substantial wealth he thereafter acquired as a
result of his secretive wealth-building activities during the marriage. (R. 688; Tr. Trans,
p. 16). During the trial, the district court also refused to receive or consider evidence
concerning the extent of Lynn's prosperity and accumulated wealth. The district court
ruled that only the amount of Lynn's current income could be admitted. It repeatedly
found irrelevant, and refused to receive any evidence pertaining to, Lynn's wealth and
accumulation of assets. (See, e.g. Trial Trans, pp. 110-116; 117, 118, 123; 146-148).
The evidence Sherrie was precluded from offering at trial concerning the extent
of Lynn's wealth and concerning his pre and post divorce wealth-building strategy may
well have qualified as "extenuating circumstances" under even the trial court's
interpretation of the phrase.
-8-

If her alimony claim is to be governed by the new statute (which went into effect
several months after she first asserted it), she should be given full opportunity to
present all evidence available to her which could support a finding of "extenuating
circumstances". She was not given that opportunity.

IV.
HAD LYNN'S OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY UNDER A
PRIOR ORDER EXPIRED BEFORE SHERRIE SOUGHT
ADDITIONAL ALIMONY? I.E. IS SHERRIE'S A "NEW"
ALIMONY CLAIM?
No. The June 24, 1992 Order Modifying Decree of Divorce expressly ordered
Lynn to continue paying alimony through October of 1994. (R. 237-241; See especially
paragraph 5 at R. 239). Sherrie's petition seeking permanent alimony was filed before
October of 1994. It was filed on August 23, 1994. At that time, Lynn was still under
court order to continue paying alimony through the fall of 1994.
The district court's finding that Sherrie was a "stranger" to Lynn at the time she
filed her request for more alimony was erroneous. Careful scrutiny of the record
(especially the June 24, 1992 order) reveals that Sherrie's claim was not a claim for
"new" alimony.
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V.
UNDER THE LAW APPLICABLE TO SHERRIE'S CLAIM,
MAY ALIMONY BE AWARDED TO A DESERVING
FORMER SPOUSE EVEN WHEN IT IS SOUGHT AFTER
THE OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY UNDER A PRIOR
ORDER HAS CEASED?
Yes. Sherrie's alimony claim should be governed by the law in effect at the time
she asserted it - August 23, 1994. There was no statute then in effect requiring a court
to find extenuating circumstances before issuing a new order for alimony addressing
new needs of the recipient. The only Utah case in which the issue had been addressed
was the 1952 case of Cole v. Cole. 239 P.2d 615 (Utah 1952). In that case, this court
expressly declined to decide whether alimony may ever be awarded when it is sought
after the obligation to pay it under a prior order has ceased. 239 P.2d at 616. It simply
ruled that a new alimony award was not appropriate in that case. The facts before this
court are far different from those presented in Cole v. Cole. There, a woman who had
deserted her husband sought alimony 12 years after his alimony obligation had ceased.
Here, Sherrie and Lynn had been married for 25 years, during which Sherrie bore 5
children Sherrie did not desert Lynn, but Lynn basically deserted her. He allowed her
home to be foreclosed upon while both divorcing her and discharging his own debts in
bankruptcy. (R. 693). After leaving her, he amassed great wealth. As he did so,
Sherrie grew both impoverished and unhealthy to the point that she is now dependent
on Church welfare and government disability for subsistence.
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There are strong societal reasons why Sherrie should be granted continuing
alimony from Lynn even if his obligation to pay alimony under a prior order had ceased.
VI.

SHOULD LYNN BE ORDERED TO PAY ALIMONY TO
SHERRIE?
Yes. As the trial court expressly found, Lynn has the ability to pay alimony.
(R. 644, 658). Lynn earns a salary in excess of $120,000 per year (R. 644). In
addition, he is provided a vehicle (Mercedes) and his transportation and car insurance
expenses are paid by his company. (R. 711; Tr. Trans, pp. 107-108). He also enjoys
full health insurance benefits through his company. (R. 711; Tr. Trans, p. 107; R. 714;
Tr. Trans, p. 120). He owns and lives in a condominium in Bountiful having an
appraised value, as of 1996, of $236,000 (R. 868). His condo contains a hot tub,
sauna, pool table, big screen TV, two other TVs and 2 VCR's. (R. 868, 869, 881). In
June of 1995, he purchased a lot in North Salt Lake for $97,000 in cash, with the intent
to build a home on it. (R. 869-870). At Christmas in 1996, he took 8 people to Hawaii
for a week vacation. (R. 898). He has access to season tickets to Utah Jazz
Basketball games (on the 19th row from the floor) and often purchases and uses Jazz
playoff tickets. (R. 866-868).
As the trial court found, Sherrie unquestionably has a need for alimony. (R. 658,
paras. 16, 17 and 18). Since March of 1996, Sherrie has been completely unable to
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work due to the progression of her debilitating rheumatoid arthritis illness. (R. 694;
Tr. Trans, pp. 39-40, 166; R. 664-666; 669-673). Overwhelming cumulative evidence of
Sherrie's condition of destitution appears in the record in the form of uncontroverted
testimony of Sherrie herself, her relief society president, her prior work supervisor and a
board certified rheumatologist. The Social Security Administration's formal findings of
total disability also indicates Sherrie's need. In addition, the trial court's Findings of
Fact Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 all support the conclusion that Sherrie desperately
needs alimony.
In short, Sherrie unquestionably needs alimony and Lynn unquestionably has the
ability to pay it. These parties were married to each other for 25 years and raised 5
children together. They are hardly "strangers" to one another. Under the district court's
ruling, Sherrie's church and the federal government have greater obligation to
contribute to her support than the man to whom she was married for 25 years. In a
civilized society whose basic unit is the family, that is a shameful travesty of justice.
VII.
SHOULD LYNN BE ORDERED TO PAY SHERRIE'S
REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED IN SEEKING THE ALIMONY SHE NEEDS?
Yes. At trial, uncontroverted evidence was presented that Sherrie had paid
attorney's fees to her own counsel in the amount of $2,450.00 and that she owed her
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counsel an additional $14,534.56 for legal work done on her behalf through the time of
trial. (Def s Trial Exhibit 8). In paragraph 6 of its April 17, 1997 order, the trial court
ordered Sherrie "to pay her attorney fees and costs, the balance of which is
$14,534.56". (R. 654). Entry of that order reflects the trial court's finding that Sherrie's
costs and attorney's fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred. No objection was
made to the proffer of testimony concerning Sherrie's attorney's fees and costs or to the
detailed time itemizations supporting it. (R. 102-104).
Only two questions remain: Who should be required to pay the costs and
attorney's fees Sherrie incurred through trial ($16,984.56) and who should be required
to pay her fees and costs incurred in this appeal? Respectfully, Sherrie submits that
both sums should be paid by Lynn. She requests this court to so order.

VIII.
ON REMAND, SHOULD SHERRIE BE ALLOWED TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HER CLAIM TO A
SHARE OF LYNN'S WEALTH BASED ON HER
CONTENTION THAT IT WAS GENERATED THROUGH A
FRAUDULENT, SECRETIVE WEALTH-BUILDING PLAN
COMMENCED DURING THE MARRIAGE?
Yes. In November of 1995, Sherrie sought leave of court to amend her petition
to modify the divorce decree to include entirely new allegations supporting her claim to
an equitable share of Lynn's present wealth due to its having originated in efforts
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expended by him during the marriage. This petition was based on Sherrie's learning of
the rapid and somewhat incredible growth and prosperity of Lynn's Beneficial
International "empire". Lynn's interest in Beneficial International had been represented
to be essentially valueless at the time of the parties' divorce. Lynn had become an
officer and director of the company 3 years before the divorce and held a substantial
block of stock in it. The marital financial hardships began about the time Lynn became
involved with this business.
In 1995, Sherrie caused her counsel to conduct investigation which led her to
believe that Lynn had orchestrated both his divorce and his personal bankruptcy in a
manner to deprive her of a share of his interest in Beneficial International and other
related business entities controlled by him. (R. 446). Sherrie was granted leave to
amend her petition to modify. Her amended verified petition to modify was filed on
January 24, 1996. (R. 465-471). (See also Addendum No. 3 to Sherrie's Appeal Brief).
On May 1, 1995, the following law went into effect:
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due
to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of
both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property
and awarding alimony.
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UCA § 30-3-5(e) (1995). Although this law was in effect at the time Sherrie first
asserted her claim to a share of Lynn's current wealth, the district court found that it did
not apply to Sherrie's property distribution claim. In this, the district court clearly erred
as a matter of law.
Being applicable, the statute provides basis for receipt of the evidence Sherrie
sought but was not allowed to introduce at trial.
The Wilde marriage was a marriage of long duration - 25 years. It dissolved on
the threshold of a major change in Lynn's income. During the last years of the
marriage, the parties endured great financial hardship while Lynn undertook to build the
business which later brought him great prosperity. His present wealth, Sherrie
contends, is a result of the groundwork he laid during the last several years of his
marriage. During those years, the Wilde family experienced financial difficulties they
never had previously known. Lynn's personal bankruptcy discharge simultaneous with
the dissolution of his marriage gave him a fresh financial start. The prosperity that
followed was, Sherrie contends, a result of efforts expended during the marriage.
Full revelation of the facts surrounding Lynn's divorce and personal bankruptcy
may well reveal facts constituting a fraud upon the divorce and/or bankruptcy court(s).
Under Rule 60(b), URCP, a party may at any time seek relief from a judgment, order or
proceeding "for fraud upon the court".
Sherrie should be allowed to present evidence supporting the property
distribution claim set forth in her January 24, 1996 amended verified petition to modify.
-15-

CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF
Sherrie's alimony claim was asserted while Lynn was still paying alimony under
the district court's June 24, 1992 order and before the new alimony statute went into
effect. As such, it is neither a claim for "new alimony" nor governed by the 1995 version
of Section 30-3-5.
If the new version of the statute did govern Sherrie's alimony claim, the claim
should nevertheless be granted because Sherrie's case presents circumstances which
are "extenuating" within the legislature's intended meaning.
The district court erred in applying the new statute, in misconstruing its intent and
in refusing to allow evidence which may have satisfied even its own definition of
"extenuating circumstances."
Sherrie requests alimony in the amount of $3,270.35 per month consistent with
her actual needs as reflected in her trial exhibits 2 and 3. She requests that it be made
retroactive to the date of her becoming totally disabled - March 11, 1996. Sherrie also
asks that she be awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the
district court (in the total sum of $16,984.56) and her reasonable costs and fees
incurred in this appeal, as established in accordance with this court's direction.
On remand, Sherrie should be allowed to present evidence supporting her
property distribution claim.
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